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Jesus Founding the Church: A Perspective Drawing Upon Loewe and Lonergan
Dennis M. Doyle
University of Dayton

William Loewe, who directed my dissertation over twenty-five years ago, has influenced
my own work deeply. My dissertation compared the positions of Wilfred Cantwell Smith and
Bernard Lonergan on the relationship between religious belief and truth. In this essay I will try to
express some of what I have learned from my director, both while writing my dissertation and in
the decades since, about Lonergan and about theology. Taking up the issue of Jesus’ founding of
the church, I will focus especially on how Loewe’s approach to Christology has influenced my
own approach to an important issue in ecclesiology.
Loewe is one of several people who encouraged me to move beyond an explicit
concentration in Lonergan studies and to make use of what I had learned in other areas. As he
wrote, “the real demonstration of the value of Fr. Lonergan’s work consists not in its exposition
but in the creative, collaborative performance of the manifold tasks to which it so clearly urges.”1
Such tasks include not only intellectual activities but extend to the practical tasks needed to
unfold the work of salvation in concrete ways. There is Lonergan-inspired work that needs to be
done in theology as well as in Christian living, in political science as well as in political action,
in economics as well as in business leadership.
Loewe’s own work is recognizably Lonerganian in a way that involves more application
than exposition of Lonergan’s work. In some places the influence of Lonergan may be evident
only to other Lonerganians. For example, in his 1984 article, “Myth and Counter-Myth:
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William P. Loewe, “Toward a Responsible Contemporary Soteriology,” in Creativity and Method: Essays in Honor
of Bernard Lonergan, S.J,” ed. Matthew L. Lamb (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1981), 213-27, at 227.

Irenaeus’ Story of Salvation,” Loewe does not cite a single work by Lonergan. Yet the second
sentence begins, “Once theology recognizes its task to be one of mediating between the Christian
religion and the world of human culture . . . .”2 Thus an identifiably Lonerganian starting point
can be located in the essay. But it is even more evident to anyone connected with Lonergan
studies that the entire essay, in which Loewe explores how Irenaeus’ pre-theoretical contribution
to christological tradition reflects a mythic form of consciousness that battles against the Gnostic
myths, finds its background in Lonergan’s discussion of the ongoing discovery of mind in the
chapter “Doctrines” in Method in Theology. Finally, the climactic point of the essay, that “For
Irenaeus the cross of Christ provides the key which unlocks the treasure hidden in scripture,” can
be connected to a Lonerganian Christology and soteriology that focus on the law of the cross.3
This is not to say that Loewe is in any way concealing the influence of Lonergan in his
work. In the article on Irenaeus he cites his own previous article on soteriology that explicitly
explains and documents the Lonerganian background of his operating terms and concepts. These
two articles can be read together as part of a larger project in soteriology so that the Irenaeus
article is really not so cordoned off from its roots as it might first appear to the reader who
simply encounters it as a free-standing article in an annual volume of the College Theology
Society.

Dissertation Lessons
My dissertation was a study of Wilfred Cantwell Smith and Bernard Lonergan that
compared their treatment of the question of religious truth. The specific focus was on how their

2

William P. Loewe, “Myth and Counter-Myth: Irenaeus’ Story of Salvation,” in Interpreting Tradition: The Art of
Theological Reflection, The Annual Publication of the College Theology Society, vol. 29, ed. Jane Kopas (Chico, CA:
Scholars Press, 1984), 39-53, at 39.
3
Loewe, “Myth and Counter-Myth,” 52.

differences on religious truth were reflected in the contrasting ways in which they fashioned a
distinction between faith and belief. Smith found religious truth to emerge from interreligious
dialogue within a context of a shared faith generating a corporate critical consciousness that
transcended particular beliefs. Lonergan found the attainment of religious truth to be linked with
faith, understood as seeing through the eyes of love, as it issues in belief. Belief is based upon a
judgment of value by which one accepts the judgments of fact and the judgments of value that
are handed on through a religious tradition. Smith’s position was avant garde if not trendy.
Lonergan’s position, itself future-looking and ingenious, remained a way by which theologians
could help to guide the faithful transmission of what they themselves had received.
The third of four sections of my dissertation was devoted to explicating Lonergan’s
understanding of the relationship between faith, belief, and truth. It was in this section that I had
to do the most re-writing and re-casting. It was not just a matter of writing clearer sentences and
paragraphs with fewer typos and grammatical errors. It was more a matter of responding to
Loewe’s criticisms concerning my rudimentary grasp of what Lonergan was about. Loewe had
me perform two major rounds of revision of this segment. I had to move from my semantic and
conceptual entry point into Lonergan’s definitions and their immediate interconnections to a
fuller understanding of how these meanings and concepts played out within the framework of
Lonergan’s overall project.
Both major revisions of my third section involved returning to the texts and trying to
achieve a deeper grasp of what Lonergan was about. Lonergan himself had written of the years
that he had spent reaching up to the mind of Aquinas. I had to spend a couple of years reaching
up to the mind of Lonergan. I am not claiming to have attained the heights. I am claiming that

after two major revisions in response to Loewe’s criticisms I had a respectable grasp of what
Lonergan was about.
Loewe led me to the insight that for Lonergan the current task of theology was the
performance of a transposition of truths grasped within one context into a new dynamic context.
The prior context was one in which a particular culture had been understood as normative. The
new context is one of cultural pluralism. In the prior context, theoretical formulations had come
to be taken as absolute and permanent. In the new context, the relationship between the realms of
theory and common sense had to be grasped from an examination of the realm of interiority. The
permanence of meaning as well as the truth of prior understandings had to be distinguished from
the particular ways in which they had been expressed.
The ability to transpose the meanings understood in the prior context into the new,
dynamic context depended upon the authenticity of one’s religious, moral, and intellectual
conversion. One’s own religious, moral, and intellectual conversion remained connected to the
religious, moral, and intellectual conversion of one’s community. As grounded in conversion, the
attainment of objectivity is the fruit of authentic subjectivity.
In Method in Theology Lonergan gave only one explicit example of transposing a
theological concept from the prior context to the new context. What had been labeled in a rather
objectified manner as “sanctifying grace” in the prior context needed to be appropriated in the
new context as the dynamic state of being in love with God. This transposition was central to
Lonergan’s overall project. Grasping this allowed me to see that both Lonergan’s definition of
faith (the knowledge born of religious love) and his definition of religious belief (the acceptance
of the judgments of fact and judgments of value of a religious tradition) involved a transposition
of earlier theological categories whose definitions had tended to become reified.

In the prior context faith had been the supernatural virtue by which one believes. Belief
had been the act of faith. In the new, dynamic context, faith takes on an explicitly existential
element. Faith sees through the eyes of love. Belief, which entails the acceptance of what is
objectively true, requires a judgment of value rooted in authenticity. Communities of people who
are authentically converted live out their experience of being in love with God. These people see
through the eyes of love. Such sight leads them not only to accept as true the judgments of fact
and the judgments of value upon which their religious tradition is based, but also to appropriate
the meanings of these judgments with proper understanding.
Many contemporary thinkers, including some theologians, tend to regard a reliance on
religious belief as uncritical because one must accept what one has not arrived at for oneself in
an immanently generated manner. Lonergan, however, treated belief as a form of knowledge.
Although belief is not immanently generated knowledge, it is still a legitimate form of
knowledge that is rooted in a judgment of value. One makes a reasonable judgment to believe. In
the case of religious belief, the underlying judgment of value flows from the faith which is itself
rooted in love. Religious belief requires more than “pure” reason, but it is by no means
unreasonable or uncritical. Vigilance against the irrational continues to purify the religious
believer’s understanding.
Lonergan described how in the usual process of coming to know something,
understanding will precede judgment. In this regard, questions of meaning precede questions of
truth. When it comes to belief, however, the reverse is the case. One accepts as true something
which one does not know for oneself. Lonergan emphasized that belief, including religious
belief, constitutes a kind of knowledge. But it is a kind of knowledge in which the embrace of

truth is basically prior to achieving a fuller understanding. One accepts the doctrine of the Trinity
without comprehending it, yet Christians can grow in their understanding of this truth.4
A consideration of the eight functional specialties into which Lonergan categorized
theological tasks can offer further exploration of how knowledge can precede understanding in
matters of belief.5 The first four specialties constitute what Lonergan called the mediating phase
of theology, the pursuit of knowledge prior to conversion and prior to an embrace of an explicit
tradition as revelatory. These four are Research, Interpretation, History, and Dialectics. The
second four functional specialties constitute the mediated phase, the phase that is based in
conversion and the embrace of a tradition. These four are Foundations, Doctrines, Systematics,
and Communications. The first four functional specialties correspond with the Lonerganian
levels of conscious operations labeled experience, understanding, judgment, and decision. The
second four functional specialties also correspond with these levels of conscious operations, but
in reverse order: Foundations is linked with decision, Doctrines with judgment, Systematics with
understanding, and Communications with experience.
This reversal of ordering explains why in Lonergan’s Method in Theology, the seventh
functional specialty of Systematics, which corresponds with meaning and understanding, comes
after the sixth functional specialty, Doctrines, which corresponds with truth and judgment. This
ordering is in contrast to the second and third functional specialties of Interpretation and History,
in which what corresponds with understanding and meaning precedes judgment and truth. In the
first four functional specialties, coming to grasp a range of possible understandings comes before
making judgments concerning truth and prior to a deeper grasp of meaning through further
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understanding. In these second four functional specialties, the acceptance of revealed truth
expressed as doctrine precedes further attempts to achieve systematic understanding.
The second four functional specialties are not thereby uncritical or fideistic, for at least
three reasons. First, each functional specialty remains interconnected with the tasks and
standards of all the functional specialties, including the earlier ones that are explicitly critical.
Systematic understanding of doctrine remains dependent upon what is arrived at in interpretation
and in history. Theologians are not licensed to ignore history or science because they are
operating in a different functional specialty. Second, systematic understanding of doctrine is
further critically linked with the authenticity of the religious, moral, and intellectual conversion
of the individuals and communities within which the meaning of doctrines are appropriated and
lived out. Third, belief, when grounded in an authentic judgment of value, is not uncritical.
One embraces or remains within a particular religious tradition because of a judgment of
value, in this case, a belief. This belief is possible because one sees with the eyes of love. One
sees with the eyes of love because one is in the dynamic state of being in love. One can engage
in belief because it is good to believe. One can believe in a religious tradition because through
one’s eyes of love one sees that it is good to believe in that tradition. Religious beliefs constitute
a world of meaning in which believers live. The initial judgment of the truth of a tradition’s
beliefs is a judgment about the way of life in which the tradition issues, the visions it inspires, the
institutions it engenders, the good it brings about, and the love that it manifests. Surely one is
also attracted by an initial sense of the truth of the basic judgments of fact and judgments of
value that constitute the tradition’s world of meaning. One can spend the rest of one’s life
coming to a fuller lived realization of the truth and meaning of these basic beliefs.

Loewe challenged me to move my understanding of Lonergan from the level of the
semantic and the conceptual to the level of method. What took me to this more sophisticated
understanding was the insight that the theological task being called for by Lonergan was
basically one of transposition of beliefs from the prior context to the new context of cultural
pluralism, and that the ability to perform such a transposition was the fruit of religious, moral,
and intellectual conversion. Religious beliefs remain claims to truth. The subjective, existential,
and communal dimensions of making religious truth claims are brought to the fore.
Lonergan’s approach to theology is to be contrasted with approaches that begin with an
antipathy between theology on the one hand, and history, the human sciences, and the natural
sciences on the other hand. The best of human knowledge obtained through the most critical of
academic methods has its place in the larger theological enterprise. The first four of Lonergan’s
functional specialties are dedicated to the pursuit of knowledge in an academic and critical
manner.
Lonergan’s approach to theology is equally to be contrasted, however, with approaches
that would take a so-called purely academic point of view, such as an historical reconstruction of
religious events, as the starting point for all theological tasks. On the contrary, once a theologian
moves into Lonergan’s final four functional specialties, those four that correspond with the tasks
that have usually been thought to constitute “theology,” the most basic task that the theologian is
performs is the appropriation of a religious tradition as it informs the life of a religious
community. Academic integrity as well as authentic conversion serve as necessary prerequisites
and ongoing guides and supports for this most fundamental task of appropriation.

Post-Dissertation Lessons

Earlier I made the claim that Loewe’s work is Lonergan-saturated in a particular way that
moves more in the direction of application than in the direction of exposition. In the years since
writing my dissertation, I have been influenced by the way in which Loewe’s application of
Lonergan goes beyond the transposition of neo-Scholastic categories to a more thoroughly
reconstructive approach to Christology and soteriology. If Lonerganian theology were to be
mostly about the transposition of neo-Scholastic categories into the new context of cultural
pluralism, then Loewe would be engaging in sideshows. The law of the cross was not a major
operative category in the neo-Scholastic manuals. The retrieval of Irenaeus’ soteriology would
not be of immediate relevance.
In recent decades it has become ever more clear that theology’s contemporary tasks
involve more than simple transposition. As Loewe put it in an article about the theological use of
historical Jesus studies, “The rapid collapse and near disappearance of neo-Scholastic manual
theology after Vatican II left Roman Catholic theologians with a massive task of
reconstruction.”6 Loewe draws upon the work of John Galvin to describe how an older paradigm
in Christology, one in which the neo-Scholastics drew upon Chalcedon for their basic starting
point, has given way to a newer paradigm that, starting with Jesus’ ministry, seeks to recapitulate
the entire tradition with a view toward mediating that tradition within the contemporary context.7
Lonergan’s Method in Theology offers theologians support for the massive task of
reconstruction that the present context calls for. What I have come to see more clearly in the
decades since I wrote my dissertation is that Lonergan’s identification of this task with the
transposition of neo-Scholastic categories in the new context of cultural pluralism was itself a
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very time-bound connection. It made sense when the bulk of existing theology existed in neoScholastic texts. It made sense when Lonergan was addressing himself mainly to priests and
seminarians who had been steeped in neo-Scholasticism. The focus on transposition was a way
of assuring that basic truths would remain true even as they were being appropriated into the new
context. Through the sixties and early seventies, when Lonergan was writing Method in
Theology, such a transposition was the main task of the day for Roman Catholic theology.
Even by the time I was writing my dissertation in the early eighties, however, the
theological scene had shifted dramatically. The neo-Scholastic synthesis had basically collapsed.
There were rapidly fewer and fewer theologians who had been formed in that mould. How could
theology most basically consist in a transposition of what was known and lived out in a neoScholastic context if that context itself had come to exist only in relatively rare pockets of the
theological world?
I want to be clear that I am speaking here of my own growth in perception and not of
some lack of foresight in Lonergan. It was I, and not Lonergan, who still needed to come to
grasp that method as transposition was more his way of explaining the theological project to a
significant particular group at a particular point in time than it was the eternal way to carry out
that project. My focus on transposition in my dissertation was legitimate because I concentrated
on what Lonergan was doing when he developed his position on the relationship between faith
and belief. Theology today, however, by continuing to take seriously a much wider range of
sources, is indeed about a more thorough task of reconstruction.
Reading Loewe’s work has helped me to grasp and articulate this difference. Loewe’s
acknowledgement of a fundamental theological shift gives the results of historical Jesus research

a legitimate place but does not pivot around such results. In summing up this particular point,
Loewe relies upon the Lonerganian-influenced work of David Tracy. Loewe states:
Faith, as Tracy argued, is response to Jesus encountered through the mediation of
community and tradition as God’s self-communication in the present, and what norms the
tradition is the apostolic witness to Jesus in his religious significance as the Christ.
Hence, given both the nature of historical-Jesus constructs and the nature of Christian
faith, appeals such as those of the Jesus Seminar to the “historical Jesus” as the real Jesus
that should norm Christian faith are misguided. “The historical Jesus” constitutes neither
the ground nor basis for Christian faith, nor is it the norm of Christian faith. Certainly no
historical reconstruction can prove the appropriateness of Christian response to Jesus as
God’s self-presence, although, as Tracy, Galvin, and Dulles concur, the results of
research on the historical Jesus can serve to clarify and perhaps confirm certain
presuppositions of the confession of Jesus as the Christ.8
Loewe’s work here gives me a model by which I can acknowledge more fully the radicality of
the contemporary shift in theology and still raise critical questions, from a Lonerganian
perspective, concerning how that shift is carried out.

Jesus’ Founding of the Church.
Loewe’s appreciation of both the theological usefulness and the limitations of historical
Jesus research in christology inspires my own approach to an important question in ecclesiology,
I had lunch with a couple of young theologians recently at a theology conference in
England. I mentioned to them something about Jesus founding the church. One of them said
flatly that one cannot say that Jesus founded the church. As we started to disagree about this
8
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point, he invoked Lonergan. He said that Lonergan shows us that theology must be grounded in
historical consciousness. Historical scholarship has shown us that Jesus did not really intend to
found a church. What we call the church actually developed decades after the life of Jesus.9 The
other young scholar explained to me that Lonergan gave theology an empirical starting point,
and that the taking seriously of historical research was called for by that empirical starting point.
I objected strongly on two counts: first, I argued, one can indeed say that Jesus founded
the church. To be critically-minded is to be careful about what one means and does not mean by
such a statement. One needs to clarify that one does not mean things that would contradict the
best in historical-critical scholarship.
Second, I declared (remember that this was a lunchtime conversation) that Lonergan
would agree with me. For Lonergan the shift to an empirically-based method in theology still
included an appropriation of classic doctrines. The Catholic theologian as a converted subject
operating in the final four functional specialties will articulate the basic doctrines of Catholic
Christianity and attempt to understand them systematically and to communicate them within the
context of Catholic and other communities. The articulation and understanding of doctrines will
be critical, ecumenical, and faithful in accordance both with the rational standards that apply to
all functional specialties and with the religious, moral, and intellectual conversion lived out by
the individual theologian within that theologian’s community. I argued that any attempt at a full
scale historical reconstruction represented an effort limited to the first four functional specialties.

9

In his theological writings before becoming Pope Benedict XVI, Joseph Ratzinger identified the rejection of Jesus’
founding of the church as a key element in what he labeled “ecclesiological relativism.” See Joseph Cardinal
Ratzinger, “The Ecclesiology of the Constitution Lumen Gentium,” 123-52, at 144-49, of Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith:
The Church as Communion, trans. Henry Taylor (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2005 [original German book, 2002]).
At that time Ratzinger explicitly identified Leonardo Boff’s Church: Charism and Power: Liberation Theology and the
Institutional Church, trans. by John W. Diercksmeier (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1985 [original Portuguese book
1981]) as an example of “ecclesiological relativism” linked with a faulty interpretation of the “subsists in” passage
of Lumen Gentium #8.

A fuller theological approach must include also an appropriation of a tradition’s faith claims,
with an eye toward legitimate doctrinal development, which includes an explanation of what
those claims mean if they are not to contradict either reason or faith.
Jesus Christ’s founding of the church is obviously an issue that can evoke a deeply felt
response from me. I still agree with the basics of what I had blurted out, but I wish now in a
calmer moment to recognize more of the complexities of the matter, to be more explicit about
what an historical approach has to offer theology, to acknowledge the ecumenical concerns of
those who dismiss the idea of Jesus founding a church, and finally to present my own position in
a more persuasive manner.
Even those who emphasize the limitations of what historical Jesus research can contribute
to theology might think that Jesus’ founding of the church is precisely the type of issue that
historical research can help to clarify. One is even tempted to see the question as one that is more
properly historical than theological. Did He or didn’t He? There is a scholarly consensus that
Jesus foresaw his own death as ushering in the Kingdom of God as the end of days. Jesus is not
thought to have laid intentionally the groundwork for a particular church organization to develop.
Some theologians experience the claim that Jesus founded the church as especially
problematic because of what they take to be its implications for ecumenism. Accompanied by
polemically-shaped versions of the marks of the church, the claim about the church’s founding
became prominent and hotly contested during the time of the Reformation. The debate was all
tied in with the arguments about which church is the one true church. On the Catholic side, these
claims were linked with exaggerated and unverifiable assertions about direct links between the
apostles and the historical lines of bishops and popes. To continue to affirm the truth of a phrase
whose meaning has altered substantially carries an awkwardness at best; at worst it appears to be

misleading and obfuscating. If for centuries the primary meaning given to the claim was that
Jesus built his church upon the rock of Peter, and that the lines of bishops and popes can be
directly traced back to the apostles, and if those understandings have now become historically
problematic even for Catholics themselves, should not the claim itself be acknowledged to be
problematic? In our times, the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith’s Dominus Iesus
(2000) with its strict interpretation of the “subsistit in” passage of Vatican II’s Lumen Gentium
appeared to some Catholics as well as to a number of other Christians to indicate that
contemporary Catholic teaching still misuses the concept of the church that Christ founded in a
way that is exclusionary to non-Roman Catholic Christians. For this reason some theologians
prefer to say that one can talk about various traditions and their connections with Jesus through
the Holy Spirit, but on the matter of Jesus founding the church, it would be better to take one’s
cues from historical research and admit that, in the most basic ways that such a concept has been
imagined, he did not.

Addressing Historical Concerns
My own position is that it remains important to Catholic teaching to proclaim that Jesus
Christ founded the church and that Catholic theology should seek further understanding of what
that proclamation means (and does not mean). At the same time, I concede that the semantic and
conceptual terrain is messy. For example, in non-theological educational and academic contexts,
it can be appropriate first to acknowledge that the answer to the question of whether Jesus
founded the church depends on what one intends to mean by the phrase.10 In Catholic theological
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contexts, too, the affirmation that Jesus founded the church still needs to be followed by an
exploration of what one means by the basic teaching. For example, if one means that Jesus
envisioned the offices of pope and bishop in the structured ways that they developed in history,
such a position runs counter to the evidence. If, however, one means that the community that
Jesus formed around himself developed into what we know as the church, such a position is
tenable.
I find the objection that Catholic claims surrounding Jesus’ founding of the church should
be dismissed because they represent a counter-reformational agenda somewhat ironically to have
a flaw similar to that of my own tendency to focus on transposing neo-Scholastic categories.
Instead of privileging such categories in order to transpose them, however, this objection
highlights such categories in the interest of rejecting them. In either case, neo-Scholastic
categories are given more attention than what they are due in the present context. One dimension
of my response to this objection is to move to a fuller ressourcement that can go beyond neoScholasticism and beyond the counter-reformational tendencies of early modern Catholicism and
beyond even the great treatises of the Middle Ages to include also scripture and the patristic
witness. Another dimension of my response, beyond simply the number and range of sources, is
to highlight that sources need to be interpreted by the theologian in accordance with an
intellectual conversion that allows one to identify different forms of expression linked with
various operations of human consciousness. This is a process that we observed in Loewe’s
Lonergan-inspired approach to the soteriological vision of Irenaeus.

(and their friends) appreciate better what the New Testament says and does not say about the Church.”
Harrington is aware that there also exist further tasks designed to pursue a fuller theological understanding of
what the church teaches.

In the patristic reception of scripture the church is envisioned as having many birth
moments.11 Jesus’ founding of the church needs to be understood within the context of various
highly symbolic claims that both connect the church with and distinguish the church from Israel.
The church as part of God’s eternal plan is pre-existent.12 It is pre-figured in the Ark, in the
Covenant, and in the Temple. It has its beginning in the Annunciation; the Incarnation; the
baptism of Jesus; Jesus’ various proclamations of the reign of God; the calling of the disciples;
the leadership of Peter; the power of the keys; the call to lift up one’s cross; the institution of the
Eucharist; the designation of the disciples as friends and not slaves along with Jesus’ prayer for
their unity; the blood and water that flow from the side of Christ; Mary and John at the foot of
the cross; various elements of the post-resurrection appearance stories; and the disciples inspired
by the Holy Spirit at Pentecost. Such a list can be easily and greatly expanded.
Such religious statements and claims represent various forms of expression related to
what human beings are doing when they are understanding and judging and intending. Any
theological consideration of the various points of origin attributed to the church call for an
exercise in symbolic consciousness. The various proposed birth moments of the church are not
competing in a zero-sum game such that the naming of one rules out the legitimacy of all others.
The way in which spirit-filled Christians wrote and interpreted scripture in the early Christian
centuries connected the church with the will of God, be it through the Father, the Son, the Holy
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Spirit, the Spirit-filled apostolic witness, or Mary’s “let it be.” The divine origin of the church is
related with Jesus Christ in various ways.
Ancient claims that Jesus founded the church can be linked with particular concerns that
arose in particular situations. Such is likely the case with Matthew as well as with Irenaeus. Such
concerns appear to be apologetic in nature. In Matthew, they protect against attacks on the Godgiven identity of the collective followers of Christ. In Irenaeus, they protect against the Gnostic
threat to the apostolic heritage. As such, claims that Jesus founded the church are part of the
apostolic witness in scripture and tradition. Such claims cannot simply be limited to the
Reformation and to the counter-reformational tendencies of early modern Catholicism.
Has contemporary historical research overturned such claims? We can approach this
question in a way that parallels Loewe’s approach to the issue of Jesus’ intentionality in regard to
his own consciousness of his divinity. Loewe holds that Christian faith is based first of all in
“Jesus as he is known through the witness of Scripture and the life of the community of his
followers.”13 Speculative historical reconstructions are not the basis of faith, but within limits
they can be helpful to theology. There is no clear historical consensus concerning how Jesus
understood his own identity. There is a wide range of speculation, some of it honestly a
challenge to traditional Christian doctrine. Loewe does not attempt a sure-fire historical
reconstruction of what Jesus actually thought. In the face of sensationalist reconstructions that
paint a picture of Jesus diametrically opposed to traditional understandings, Loewe is one among
numerous scholars who argue for the more likely possibility of the following scenario: Jesus had
a very intimate experience of God as Father or Abba.14 He saw himself in a very special way as
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God’s representative and he foresaw his own death and even his resurrection as being tied to the
ushering in of the reign of God. He envisioned the apostles as judges over the twelve tribes of
Israel and himself as over the apostles. He spoke in a way that placed his own authority above
the Law of Moses. It is a credible position to hold that Jesus’ self-understanding was very likely
in continuity with the ways in which Christians came to understand and express his identity and
mission in Scripture and in Tradition as the decades and centuries passed.
Taking seriously what historical studies have to offer theology, Loewe’s approach avoids
exaggerated claims about Jesus’ self-consciousness of his divinity while offering an
understanding of Jesus that can arguably fit with both theological and historical concerns. Jesus’
own self-understanding is not eliminated entirely, but neither is a historical reconstruction placed
over against traditional witness concerning him. On a commonsense faith level, Jesus’ selfunderstanding is taken to be in harmony with what tradition says about him. On a theoretical
level, the theologian recognizes that access to Jesus is mediated through centuries of faith-based
witness up through the present.
Can the will of Jesus remain at the foundation of the church even as challenges to
exaggerated claims about Jesus’ explicit intentions are addressed?15 Avery Dulles emphasized
that Jesus formed around himself a community of disciples, and from this community the church
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developed.16 This emphasis is in line with scriptural and patristic witness without including
problematic claims about Jesus explicitly intending to designate particular offices and functions.
It is an approach that takes seriously historical criticism yet can still take its place within a
symbolic consciousness that recognizes a large number of “birth moments” of the church
throughout the Old and New Testaments. It can explicitly link Baptism and the Eucharist to
Jesus’ formation of this community. It allows for the connection between later, spirit-led
developments and the will of Christ. It connects with the contemporary emphasis on the church
as a community of disciples. It is a more than credible position to hold that the church that
emerged in the early Christian centuries is the continuation of the community that Jesus himself
formed.17
Historical studies can and legitimately have influenced the formulation of Catholic
theology and official Catholic teaching concerning Jesus’ founding of the church. Francis
Sullivan, for example, traces significant lines of continuity in the transmission of apostolic
authority. He recognizes, however, that historical evidence simply does not allow one to
conclude definitively that the episcopacy understood as a differentiated office consolidating
various powers exercised by presbyters had emerged within the time of the writing of the New
Testament.18 Rather, Sullivan finds that various forms of authority were present in the early
church. By the second half of the second Christian century, there had emerged a church-wide
system of bishops of local churches in communion with one another. In the face of the Gnostic
16
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threat, the relatively quick emergence of this church-wide authoritative structure was received by
Christians as God-given with deep gratitude. The survival of the church depended upon it.
Sullivan argues that this Spirit-guided development is an integral dimension of the maturing of
the church that is comparable to the determination of the canon of scripture, and in that sense
remains valid today.19
Roger Haight agrees with Sullivan to a point. Haight accepts that the development of the
monoepiscopacy can rightly be claimed to have been necessary as well as to have been divinely
inspired. He disagrees with Sullivan, however, that the episcopal structure of the church is
binding on all Christians of all times.20 Haight makes a distinction between a structure being
divinely willed and a structure being historically necessary. He finds Sullivan’s argument to
justify the episcopacy as a legitimate structure but not as a necessary structure.
Haight’s language about Jesus’ founding of the church needs to be sifted through
carefully. Haight is explicitly developing what he calls a transdenominational ecclesiology from
below.21 He is able to say that once historical qualifications are made, “Jesus remains the founder
of the church.”22 Yet Haight also distinguishes between, on the one hand, the Christian
movement and the ecclesial existence it constitutes and, on the other hand, various particular
church structures and denominations. The Christian church with an organized structure does not
emerge until sometime after AD 100.23 For Haight, what Jesus founded was the Christian
movement or the church understood in a broad, transdenominational sense. Various structures or
patterns of organization can lay claim to being divinely willed and even in particular cases
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historically necessary, but not in an exclusive manner that would rule out other divinely willed
structures and patterns of organization. Haight uses the phrase “subsists in” in a manner that is
directly in tension with the use of that phrase in Lumen Gentium. Whereas Lumen Gentium uses
the phrase to speak of a special connection between the church that Christ founded and the
Catholic Church, Haight speaks of the ecclesial existence that “subsists in” the many institutional
forms of the various churches.
Haight insists that denominational ecclesiologies remain necessary and that his pursuit of
a transdenominational ecclesiology in any way undermines that need.24 His difference from
Sullivan, however, suggests that he expects future denominational ecclesiologies to be built upon
transdenominational presuppositions. Haight admits that his transdenominational approach is not
grounded in a concrete, historical community. What is it, then, that does ground his approach?
I suggest that Haight’s approach from below builds primarily upon an historical
reconstruction of the emergence of early Christianity. There is no distinction within Haight’s
approach between a mediating phase of theology that relies upon common academic methods
and a mediated phase that calls also for the appropriation of the faith of a concrete, particular
community in accordance with its religious, moral, and intellectual conversion. Rather Haight
describes the theological dimension of his study as bringing a level of perception and a type of
language to his historically grounded approach that recognizes the activity of God and the effects
of God’s grace. Haight claims to dismiss any type of reductionism, whether that be a historical
reductionism that ignores the divine dimension of the church or a theological reductionism that
ignores the historical dimension. Haight does not sufficiently include, however, the perspective
of the religious insider as insider, the perspective of the converted subject appropriating the
doctrines of a particular community within the lived context of that particular community.
24
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Haight’s groundbreaking and challenging has performed a service by raising many
important questions for contemporary theology. I cannot pretend that more traditionally-minded
theological approaches have adequately addressed these questions, particularly those about the
church founded by Jesus, in any final way. With Lonergan in mind, however, I would like to see
more inquiry into these questions that takes seriously the role of the theologian as a faith-based
appropriator of a lived tradition. With Loewe in mind, I would like to see more reliance on the
faith-witness of the church and less reliance on historical reconstruction as the basis for
theological work. Haight’s attempt to use two languages, that of history and theology, to gain a
range of insights into what is basically a historical reconstruction, falls short of being a
theologically adequate method.

Interpreting Lumen Gentium
A question remains about how to interpret the treatment of Jesus’ founding of the church
in Lumen Gentium. This question takes us right back to the question of the extent to which
historical reconstruction can serve either as a basis or as a corrective for faith claims. The
founding of the church appears in Lumen Gentium in five places. In paragraph #5, the church is
inaugurated when Jesus preaches the coming of the kingdom of God, and the mission of
inaugurating the church throughout the world is given when the risen Lord pours out his spirit
upon the disciples. In #8, the church that Christ founded is said to “subsist in” the Catholic
Church, governed by the successor of Peter and the bishops in communion with him, though
elements of sanctification and of truth can be found outside its visible structure. Lumen Gentium

#9 speaks of Jesus’ founding of the new Israel which is the church. Paragraphs #18-20 portray
Jesus Christ as instituting a variety of offices in the church and willing that the successors of the
apostles shepherd the church for all time. Paragraph #48 speaks of the founding of the church in
terms of the risen Christ establishing his Body which is the church by pouring out his Spirit upon
his disciples.
Paragraphs #18-20 may appear on the surface to stand in contradiction with the results of
contemporary historical research concerning whether Jesus envisioned a church with the
particular offices that gradually emerged. I read #18-20 as offering a kind of first-order narrative,
not an academic treatise that draws upon scripture and tradition to emphasize the continuity
between the church that develops in history and the will of Christ. Still, however, the wording is
careful:
. . . [apostolorum] successores, videlicet episcopos, in ecclesia sua—usque ad
consummationem saeculi pastores esse voluit [18].25
… he willed the successors [of the apostles], which one can understand as
bishops, in his church—to be shepherds until the end of the world [18].26
The use of voluit – “he willed” – can be read as being directly in reference to the
successors of the apostles, whatever shape that succession might have taken. The phrase, “which
one can understand as bishops,” should be read as a parenthetical clarification concerning what
shape the succession indeed took, rather than as a description of precisely what Jesus had
envisioned.
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Still, this sentence and the ones that follow do suggest more about the intentions of Jesus
than a strictly historically based approach could arrive at. Historical reconstruction, however, is
not the basis of Christian faith. It is to be hoped that most educated people of faith realize that
first-order narrative accounts are not intended to be police reports of what actually happened.
Few Catholics today hear stories about Adam and Eve as if they were eye-witness testimony.
Catholics believe that the gospels faithfully tell us what Jesus said and what he did, but they also
realize that variety in the accounts can reflect differences in the situations of the communities
that produced them. I find it best to read Lumen Gentium #18-20 in the light of #5 and in
conjunction with various other passages that link the church not only with Christ but also with
the Father and the Holy Spirit. I read the “subsists in” language in the light of all of these others
and tend to favor interpretations of the passage that recognize a real and significant but not
entirely unrestricted ecumenical openness.
I make these hermeneutical maneuvers because I find the claim that Jesus founded the
church to belong to contemporary Catholic teaching as well as to scripture and tradition. For all
of the many qualifications that need to be made, it still makes a difference whether Christians
believe that the church is something willed by Jesus Christ himself. If sometime in the future
Christian churches and communities by the grace of God reach more palpable forms of full
visible communion, the founding of the church by Jesus will remain an important part of the
church’s heritage. It can be hoped that future claims about Jesus founding the church can be
based on research that is significantly less polemical and more ecumenical than in the past.

What Would Lonergan Do?
So, what would Lonergan (or, for that matter, Loewe) do?

I have discussed things that I have learned from Loewe and Lonergan both during and
after writing my dissertation. Lonergan’s first four functional specialties take an empiricallybased starting point and develop positions based on the best that human reason and interpretation
can offer. Religious, moral, and intellectual conversion provides a bridge to the final four
functional specialties. The empirical, the rational, and the hermeneutical are never left behind but
rather continue to operate at full blast. Once one begins to speak in an explicitly theological
manner, however, one appropriates the teachings that have been handed down within one’s
religious tradition. One attains an horizon within which one can understand what the basic claims
of one’s tradition mean. One can articulate these doctrines in a manner that acknowledges
legitimate doctrinal development. One can seek a fuller understanding of how they fit together
with each other and with the world in which one lives. And one can live out these truths within
the context of a community whose basic meanings and values are constituted by the realities to
which the community gives witness. Loewe has helped me to read Lonergan in a way that calls
me to be open to radical change and radical action even as I strive to appropriate faithfully the
truths handed down in tradition. Most often the intellectual dimensions of these changes, I find,
are in the form of new formulations and new understandings rather than in the casting off of
inconvenient truths.
I am still a bit bothered, however, about the way I had responded to those two young
theologians at the conference in England with a defensive outburst. I must take most seriously
what Lonergan said about the way in which conflicts should be worked out within the fourth
functional specialty, “Dialectics.” He wrote:
Now the task of dealing with these conflicts pertains, not to the methodologies, but to
theologians occupied in the fourth functional specialty. Moreover, the theologian’s

strategy will be, not to prove his own position, not to refute counter-positions, but to
exhibit diversity and to point to the evidence for its roots. In this manner he will be
attractive to those who appreciate full human authenticity and he will convince those that
attain it. Indeed, the basic idea of the method we are trying to develop takes its stand on
discovering what human authenticity is and showing how to appeal to it.27
This passage reminds me of how my attempts to refute the position of my young
theologian friends, as well as my current approach, do not display sufficient appeals to human
authenticity. I need to get in touch with Bill Loewe, the facilitator of deep and authentic
intellectual conversions, and see if he can help me with this.
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